Abstract
Introduction
The cheap availability of bandwidth has made global communication and collaboration easier, but the ease of interaction has also aided those with malicious intent. Thus the security of network applications is an increasingly important topic in both academia and industry. Conformance testing of these applications tends to focus on valid requests and obvious errors.
The protocols used by modern network applications have become languages in their own right with syntax and semantics. This opens up a variety of testing methods that may be used to evaluate the security of an implementation. One approach that can be adapted is Syntax Testing [2] . In this approach, syntax and semantic errors are intentionally made in the protocol's messages to attempt to expose vulnerabilities.
State based protocols are protocols in which the handling of one message depends on the contents of a previous message. This paper builds on previous research [4, 11] that mutates existing messages to test the security of a given application. However before sending multiple mutated versions of a message in a state based protocol the application must first be placed in the appropriate state to receive the message. We present a novel way of transitioning an application to a given state without having to fully specify the state space of the protocol. Only the data dependencies need be specified. These data dependencies are used in the automatic generation of many test messages, which are mutations of captured legitimate traffic.
Testing State Based Protocols
One approach would be to model the protocol using automata, which are used in some cases to specify the protocol. However, this is a heavy weight solution in that the interpreted state machine is essentially a functional client. For example, PROTOS [8] uses a script and actions in a higher order attribute grammar. The exact exchange to be tested must be scripted using a combination of the grammar and actions.
Our insight is: why not let an actual client drive the sequencing of the data units? A client that has passed the standard conformance tests for the protocol can act as an oracle representing the state transitions inherent in the protocol. Standard testing strategies can be used to provide path coverage through the state space of the protocol.
Protocol Tester and State Protocols
Protocol Tester [4, 11] is a project at Queen's and the Royal Military College of Canada that is investigating using Program Comprehension 1
Techniques to perform security testing on implementations of network protocols. Figure 1 shows the overall structure of our system. At the bottom of the figure is a network connecting the test system and a client system that is interacting with the test system. A sniffer is used to capture one or more valid protocol data units (PDUs) that are sent from the client to the test system. A PDU may be a single packet, or it may be spread over multiple packets. These files are decoded into a textual representation by a decoder.
The description of the protocol [11] contains a variety of information. It contains the syntax of the protocol, transfer encoding information and semantic information such as constraints between fields, ordering of data fields and if a given field must be unique. Our approach extends the industry standard ASN.1 [5] description language with XML markup encode the semantic constraints.
The markup and execution engine is implemented in TXL [3] . It extracts those constraints from the protocol description that apply to the current PDUs and uses those to generate the variants of the PDUs which are then re-encoded and injected back into the network.
The top of the figure represent the extension for handling state based protocols. Additional constraints are added to the protocol description to describe the data dependencies introduced by the state characteristics of the protocol.
The previous version of SCL [11] contains only constraints that applied to fields within a given PDU. These constraints remain in the new version of SCL, since we still wish to automatically generate mutant PDUs. But we have extended SCL to include constraints between PDUs as well as between fields within a PDU. The new constraints between PDUs indicate where the injector should copy data, possibly computing a value. A set of client functions are provided by the injector such as calculating checksums and encrypting passwords.
As with the intra-PDU constraints, the inter-PDU constraints are specified symbolically using field names. Since some fields may have variable lengths (such as user and file names), the locations of these fields within a given PDU cannot be known ahead of time. These names will be converted to byte positions once the captured PDUs are analyzed. As an example, one constraint on the session setup packet in the SMB protocol is expressed as:
The constraint indicates that the password field of the session setup is based on a function. The first parameter of the function uses the modifier EXTERNAL to indicate that the value must be obtained from the user when a test configuration is generated from a set of captured PDUs. The second parameter is obtained from the encryption key field of the response to the negotiation PDU.
The protocol extractor, implemented in TXL, processes the protocol description and after performing syntax and semantic checks, extracts a Tuple Attribute (TA) factbase. This factbase contains facts identifying each of the fields of each type of PDU in the protocol and facts that identify the constraint that applies to the field.
The PDU extractor, also implemented in TXL, converts the textual PDUs into another TA factbase. This second factbase contains facts identifying the type of each of the captured PDUs, the byte location of each field within each PDU and a relation linking each PDU field to the field in the Protocol factbase.
When the protocol description is initially processed, each of the field and type names are given unique names, and any references to these names in constraints are similarly changed. The unique names of user defined types are included in the grammar given to the decoder so that they may be included in the textual form of the PDU.
The analysis phase shown in Figure 1 is responsible for selecting the constraints from the factbase that are applicable to the current PDU set. This is done with a simple grok [9] script. The script reads the combined factbase and extracts those constraints for which all fields in the constraint occur in protocol factbase. It also extracts the start and end position of each field involved in a constraint from the protocol factbase.
A TXL program then converts the constraints identified by the grok script into the form used by the injector. For example, the constraint VALUE(SessionSetup-PK_Request_sessionKey) ==VALUE(Negotiate-PK_Response_sessionKey) is related to the fields SendPK_2.SessionSetupPK.sessionKey (47,50) RecPK_1. NegotiatePK.RespPK.sessionKey (52, 55) Since the unique names contain the names of the PDU files, the TXL program can convert the constraint to SendPK_2.47.50 == RecPK_1.52.55
The TXL program also recognizes the EXTER-NAL modifier in the constraint and prompts the user for a value for the external field. Thus the constraint element EXTERNAL(password) and the user input zhang is converted to password=="zhang"
Validation
The approach was validated against two protocols, the SMB/CIFS [12] protocol and the Apple File Sharing Protocol (AFP) [1] .
For the SMB protocol, the test environment consisted of two Linux computers, one running the samba server the other a samba client (samba is an implementation of SMB for Unix systems). Three sequences of packets were captured using SNORT[13]. These were: create an empty file, read a file, and write a file. The first two sequences (create,read) each consisted of 9 PDUs and the server responses. The third sequence (write) consisted of 12 PDUs and the server responses.
The purpose of the validation was to determine the ability to retransmit the sequence of packets and place the server into a state that mutated packets could be injected, not to detect vulnerabilities. Consequently only 5 mutated packets were generated for each packet. We then verified that the injector could retransmit each each of the original packets in the sequence with appropriate modification before transmitting the mutant packets. We did not observe any security vulnerabilities.
The Apple File Sharing Protocol (AFP) was tested with only a single sequence of packets captured between a PowerBook and an apple desktop computer. This sequence created a file on a public shared folder. Five mutated packets were created and injected. Again due to the limited number of mutants, we did not observe any vulnerabilities.
Related Work
Other methods have also been used to test state based protocols. One approach is to model the protocol using automata based approaches [9, 10] . Approaches mixing abstract specifications such as grammars and code are also possible [8, 14] . What is common to all of these approaches is that the state space of the server (or client) must specified in some way.
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The PROTOS project [8] at Oulu University uses a protocol grammar using higher order attribute grammars to generate variant PDUs. The grammar is modified using a script to allow the desired errors and then a walker walks the grammar tree, automatically generating the PDUs and analyzing responses. The higher ordered attribute grammar actions are custom written java routines, triggered when the walker reaches specific grammar nodes. The PROTOS approach was extended at Cisco [14] This approach, uses a user defined external callback routine. This routine is custom written for each protocol. It is used to verify the return PDUs and make corresponding changes to the test PDUs.
Conclusions
We have shown a light weight approach for repeated testing of a given state in a state based protocol. A captured sequence of packets is modified as they are resent to the target system and the data dependencies in the captured sequence are derived automatically from a description of the protocol by the same system that also generates the mutants used to test the security of the implementation.
While our approach does not eliminate the need to implement some of the functionality of the protocol, it eliminates the need to implement or model the state transitions of the protocol. While no vulnerabilities were observed, the point of the tests were to show that we could get the server into the correct state in which to send the mutants. In this we were successful.
